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31 Oct 2019

Benevolence

Jean-Michel Zazzi: Friedrich Nietzsche (2019) 

To read what one commentator writes, you'd think that Nietzsche's entire project (assuming it's possible to ascribe such a notion of purity and wholeness to his work) was based on the concept of Schadenfreude and that the greatest thing about his revaluation of values was that it allowed one to revel in the misfortune of others - including malignant ex-girlfriends - in good conscience.*

That would be very much mistaken, however.

For whilst it's true that Nietzsche rejects the Christian virtue of pity [Mitleiden] and speaks of the positive role that cruelty has played in the formation of man (often using Grausamkeit as synonymous with Kultur), so too does he privilege terms such as Wohlwollen in his text - what we in English-speaking countries term benevolence.

For Nietzsche, like the rest of us, doesn't merely 'deal in damage and joy', he also deals in goodwill and affirms the idea of having a cheerful, friendly disposition. This is particularly true in his mid-period writings.

In Human, All Too Human, for example, Nietzsche writes of those little, daily acts of kindness that, although frequent, are often overlooked by those who study morals and manners; those smiling eyes and warm handshakes, etc., that display what D. H. Lawrence terms phallic tenderness, but Nietzsche simply calls politeness of the heart.**  

These things have played a far more important role in the micropolitics of everyday life and the construction of community than those more celebrated virtues such as sympathy, charity, and self-sacrifice.

Of course the power of malice also plays a key role in human relations - and Nietzsche affirms an emotional economy of the whole - but, as I have said, it's profoundly mistaken to read from this that he is some kind of sadistic psychopath.

In other words, moving beyond good and evil does not mean behaving like an unethical little shit and I would remind Dr Solomon that "the state in which we hurt others is rarely as agreeable [...] as that in which we benefit others; it is a sign that we are still lacking power".**

Criminal lunatics who carry out atrocities and seek to justify their actions by calling on Nietzsche's name are invariably bad and/or partial readers; individuals as confused in their thinking as they are unrestrained and immoderate in their actions.  


* See the remarks made by Simon Solomon following my recent post on the subject of schadenfreude: click here.

** Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human, trans. R. J. Hollingdale, (Cambridge University Press, 1996), I. 2. 49.

** Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. Walter Kaufmann, (Vintage Books, 1974), I. 13. 


4 comments:

  1. An interesting response to the original topic, though we feel, in many ways, a presumptuous misreading - and indeed distortion - of our original comment, some of the detail and nuance of which has also been neglected.

    1. In the first instance, to respond to comments on a post about Schadenfreude (which we would provisionally translate as 'joy in damage') with a piece on 'Benevolence' is itself questionable to us if this is taken to construct some kind of opposition or psychological dualism, as Stephen's subsequent remarks seem to imply. However, Schadenfreude is not synonymous with malevolence per se, but rather embodies a complex joy in others' misfortune.

    2. As an academically credentialled scholar of Nietzsche's work, Dr Alexander is well-warranted in redrawing our attention to the detailed complexity - and even contradictoriness - of Nietzsche's project. It's unfortunate, therefore, that this apparently lures him into using a lexicon we didn't use, one which begins by apparently affirming an already problematic equation of 'sadism' and 'psychopathy'. Quite how behaving like an 'unethical little shit' fits with this discussion also leaves us mystified.

    3. For Nietzsche's global statement on this topic in 'Human All Too Human', readers may care to ruminate on the following for its clear valuation of the supreme indifference of pleasure/inpleasure to others, the gratifications of power, and his delimitation of the pretensions of sympathy:

    'The Inoffensive in Badness.—Badness has not for its object the infliction of pain upon others but simply our own satisfaction as, for instance, in the case of thirst for vengeance or of nerve excitation. Every act of teasing shows what pleasure is caused by the display of our power over others and what feelings of delight are experienced in the sense of domination. Is there, then, anything immoral in feeling pleasure in the pain of others? Is malicious joy devilish, as Schopenhauer says? In the realm of nature we feel joy in breaking boughs, shattering rocks, fighting with wild beasts, simply to attest our strength thereby. Should not the knowledge that another suffers on our account here, in this case, make the same kind of act, (which, by the way, arouses no qualms of conscience in us) immoral also? But if we had not this knowledge there would be no pleasure in one's own superiority or power, for this pleasure is experienced only in the suffering of another, as in the case of teasing. All pleasure is, in itself, neither good nor bad. Whence comes the conviction that one should not cause pain in others in order to feel pleasure oneself? Simply from the standpoint of utility, that is, in consideration of the consequences, of ultimate pain, since the injured party or state will demand satisfaction and revenge. This consideration alone can have led to the determination to renounce such pleasure.—Sympathy has the satisfaction of others in view no more than, as already stated, badness has the pain of others in view. For there are at least two (perhaps many more) elementary ingredients in personal gratification which enter largely into our self satisfaction: one of them being the pleasure of the emotion, of which species is sympathy with tragedy, and another, when the impulse is to action, being the pleasure of exercising one's power. Should a sufferer be very dear to us, we divest ourselves of pain by the performance of acts of sympathy.—With the exception of some few philosophers, men have placed sympathy very low in the rank of moral feelings: and rightly.'

    - BGE, 'History of the Moral Feelings' [103 (127-128)]: https://www.gutenberg.org/files/38145/38145-h/38145-h.htm

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  2. While it's daunting to enter the arena with this doughty pair of hard-hitters, 'we' might dare, on World Vegan Day, to declare that a diminishing number of die-hard carnivores around the world (whose company included Stephen and Simon at the last count) delight daily in the pain and suffering of others, relishing a superiority over sentient beings farmed for profit as food products.
    Fortunately, since Peter Singer's 'Animal Liberation', the sense of sympathy, empathy and compassion has been ranking steadily higher in the hierarchy of 'moral feelings' amongst all whose philosophy of life is keenly sensitive and aware.

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  3. In my experience, vegetarians and vegans are some of the most pettily resentful, self-righteous and unempathic people I've come across (probably owing to a repression of their native cruelty, blood lust and violence). As my first exhibit pursuant to this thesis, I give you another Stephen/Steven, the former Smiths frontman, Mr S. Morrissey - about whom the lovely Sandie Shaw (like the presiding presence of TTA, a jewel in the crown of Essex) once sang: 'You don't eat meat / But you eat your heart out, Steven'). Which just goes to show we all need to rend flesh in one way or another - including badgers.

    (Now off to slaughter a fatted calf. Toodle loo!)

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