17 Feb 2026

Retromania: Reviewed and Reassessed - Part 2: Now (Chapters 1-5)

Simon Reynolds: Retromania 
(Faber and Faber, 2011)
 
Note that page numbers given in the text refer to the 2012 edition of Retromania
Part 1 of this post can be accessed by clicking here.
 
 
I. 
 
It's telling that Reynolds still thinks the crucial element of pop is the music; that all the rest is just ephemera - disappointing that he should still posit such a clear distinction between the sound and the look. 
 
Nevertheless, I share his horror of rock and pop museums and probably wouldn't visit one (unless, I suppose, it were in the name of research) and I'm pleased to see him quote Julie Birchill's line about anything that can fit into rock's rich tapestry (i.e., be conveniently and seamlessly sewn into the fabric of history) is dead at heart
 
This includes pretty much every genre, every band, every record, but I'm happy that Reynolds chooses to give a special mention to the Clash's London Calling (1979), which "re-rooted punk in the riches of rock 'n' roll and Americana, and was duly anointed Greatest Album of the Eighties by Rolling Stone" [10] - the kind of album your older sister buys you for Christmas [a].   
 
Apparently, "Theodore Adorno was the first to point out the similarity of the words 'museum' and mausoleum'" [11]. It's a phonetic resemblance rather than an etymological link, of course, but true to note that the former too is a final resting place for objects that have passed on and are now similar to "medieval sacred relics [... which] elicit morbid awe rather than scholarly respect" [13].
 
I understand why people defend museums and public collections of work, or why some people think it crucial to document, commemorate, archive, preserve and restore, etc. But, like Reynolds, "there's a part of me that will always thrill to, and agree with, the Futurist manifestos" [21]. Marinetti called on us to flood the museums, just as, many years later, Malcolm McLaren would insist that history is for pissing on.
 
In sum, we can all agree that there's been a massive cultural shift; from the modernist obsession with making new and leaping into the future, to our current preoccupation with heritage and the protecting of things deemed to have historic value. The problem is: "History must have a dustbin, or History will be a dustbin, a gigantic, sprawling garbage heap." [27] [b] 
 
 
II. 
 
Generally speaking, like Reynolds, I avoid band reunions. For as he notes, they are usually a "recipe for disappointment" [39]. I saw the Sex Pistols play Finsbury Park in the summer of 1996 at a friend's invitation (and insistence) and wasn't impressed.
 
As for rock 're-enactments' ... What's the point: "It seems obvious that the simulation of 'being there' fails on every level: you know there's no real danger [...] you know what the outcome is going to be" [51]
 
Having said that, however, Reynolds offers a fascinating and strong defence of the latter, which ultimately relies upon what Derrida terms the myth (or metaphysicsof presence and a dash of what Walter Benjamin describes as an artwork's aura
      
"Although they've emerged out of the art world rather than from rock culture itself, rock re-enactments resonate with a buried hunger within the music scene for a spasm like punk or rave that would turn the world upside down. On the face of it, re-enactments seem just to feed into a backwards-looking culture that's taking us ever-further from the conditions in which such total transformations and singular disruptions were possible. But perhaps the artists are onto something when they talk about failure as the goal: a goad to the audience, simultaneously stirring up and frustrating the longing for the Event." [53-54]
 
"Re-enactment art is at once an extension of and an inversion of performance art, which is event-based by definition. Performance art is all about the here and now. Its components include the bodily presence of the artists, a physical location and its duration [...] Re-enactment is like a spectral form of performance art: what the viewer witnesses never quite achieves full presence or present-ness." [54]
 
In other words, authenticity is tangible whilst the ghostly is never quite the real deal (no matter how haunting it may be).  
 
 
III. 
 
I mentioned YouTube in passing in part one of this post and Reynolds devotes a whole chapter to the question of music and memory (Ch. 2: Total Recall), describing the online video sharing platform as an "indiscriminate chaos of amateur cultural salvage" [56]. That would make a nice tagline, but I'm not sure Google would go for it. 
 
Reynolds continues:
 
"YouTube's ever-proliferating labyrinth of collective recollection is a prime example of the crisis of overdocumentation triggered by digital technology [...] the astronomic expansion of humanity's resources of memory." [56]
 
Nietzsche wouldn't like it - innocence and becoming are tied to forgetfulness, not memory - and Heidegger wouldn't like it; we remain unfree so long as we remain enframed by the essence of technology, whether we spend hours on YouTube or not.  
 
Because we have instant access to the past, "the presence of the past in our lives has increased immeasurably and insidiously" [57]. And this erosion of the here and now is probably not great for our well-being: we become unable to live in the moment; incapable of focusing on work, or fully immersing ourselves even in the things we enjoy:
 
"Attention-deficit disorder is the name of this condition, but like  so many ailments and dysfunctions under late capitalism, the source of the disorder is not internal to the sufferer, nor his or her fault; it's caused by the environment, in this case the datascape." [73]
 
Amusingly, Reynolds confesses that he's now nostalgic for an era of boredom contra this time of total distraction and a million-and-one possibilities; "a cultural economy of dearth and delay" [74] and an experience of tedium so intense "it was almost spiritual" [74]. Technology has even robbed us of this.          
 
IV.
 
"This is one of the big questions of our era: can culture survive in conditions of limitlessness?" [77]
 
The short answer is: it depends on what Nietzsche terms the plastic power of a people; i.e., their capacity to incorporate the past and the foreign and to balance an overwhelming amount of knowledge with the need for action and forgetting. A strong, healthy culture possesses high plastic power and is able to use history for life rather than allowing the past to become the gravedigger of the present [c]
 
Unfortunately, I'm not sure ours is a strong, healthy culture. But maybe my post-Nietzschean pessimism and Reynolds's cultural anxiety will prove mistaken ... 
 
For maybe the digital environment is that rhizomatic utopia that Deleuze and Guattari term a plane of immanence; i.e., a non-hierarchical virtual field of pure connectivity, where all concepts and forms emerge through, and are defined by, their speed, movement, and intensity. 
 
Or, to put it another way, maybe the internet is an open, unmediated, and self-organising space that exists without fixed structures or transcendent rules, making it a fantastic place for creating new possibilities. 
 
But then again, maybe not: maybe it's a kind of hell to which we are damned for all eternity.
 
 
V. 
 
Chapter 3 of Retromania is on record collecting and provides a fascinating psycho-philosophical insight into the phenomenon, with references to all the usual suspects - Freud, Benjamin, Baudrillard, et al.
 
Having said that, one can't help wondering at times if Retromania might have benefitted from a ruthless edit; I'm sure I'm not the only reader to find it a bit meandering at times. I understand it's a work of critically-informed journalism and not an academic text, but, even so, a sharper analytic focus would've been nice [d]
 
Anyway, as someone who doesn't collect records, has never downloaded or file shared music, and doesn't own an iPod or an MP3 player, this chapter doesn't particularly interest. Though I do like this observation: 
 
"First music was reified, turned into a thing (vinyl records, analogue tapes) you could buy, store, keep under your own persona; control. Then music was 'liquified', turned into data that could be streamed, carried anywhere, transferred between different devices." [122]
 
Should we, then, demand the return of objects? As an objectophile and object-oriented philosopher, readers will probably be able to guess my answer to this. 
 
 
VI. 
 
Chapter 4 is on the rise of the curator - and that does excite my interest. 
 
For, in a sense, I feel myself to be the curator of Torpedo the Ark; someone who doesn't merely connect ideas and images, but reimagines and recontextualises them; someone who - most importantly - cares as well as creates (etymologically, the word curate comes from the Latin cura, meaning to care or safeguard, as Reynolds rightly reminds us).    
 
Moving on, here's another line that seems indisputably true: 
 
"Once, rock 'n' roll was a commentary on adolescent experience; over time, rock itself became that experience, overlapping with it and at time substituting for it entirely." [135] 
 
I get the impression Reynolds feels that this results in ersatz emotion and cliché; "songs aren't torn from the soul so much as lovingly pieced together" [139]. But is he really defending the "rock ethos of blustery authenticity" [139] here ...? 
 
It certainly feels like it when he takes a pop at The Darkness and describes their amusing take on metal as malignant; "a tumour of not-really-meaning-it that eroded any actual power that metal still possessed" [140]. That's more than a bit harsh or histrionic; to write of the cancer of irony that has "metastasised its way through pop culture" [140] has unpleasant echoes of Nazi rhetoric [e]
 
Again, one is obliged to ask: is it really so terrible if a band assembles their identity "within a kind of economy of influences" [141], rather than "drawing from deep within their personal life" [141]? I don't think so. Art doesn't have to be inhuman, but there's always an impersonal element to it otherwise its just an emotional expression of the individual and a washing of dirty laundry in public.   
 
And, further more, reference is not always deference; nor indeed is citation merely a "form of showing off or connoisseurial conceit" [141]. It can be. But it doesn't have to be. For the most part, it's an acknowledgement of the fact that Romantic ideals of originality, authenticity, and genius are just that and all creation takes place within an intertextual context. To some extent, we are all monsters made from multiple parts and dead tissue and even the good doctor Frankenstein himself was basically a Promethean plagiarist playing God.   
 
   
VII. 
 
I mentioned earlier - a couple of times I think - the importance of forgetting. And so I'm pleased to see Reynolds write this: 
 
"Maybe we need to forget. Maybe forgetting is as essential for a culture as it is existentially and emotionally necessary for individuals." [159] 
 
But there's not much chance of forgetting in the age of the cathedralesque box set ... in which the past is repackaged and remastered and made Whole; "the box set is where an old enthusiasm goes to die: a band or genre you loved frozen into an indigestible chunk [...] bloated with out-takes [... and] impossible to listen to all the way through" [161] [f]
 
 
VIII. 
 
Apparently, Japan is not only the land of the rising sun, but also the empire of retro:  
 
"No other country on Earth [...] has dedicated itself so intensively to archiving the annals of Western popular, semi-popular and downright unpopular music. And no other music-producing nation has blurred the border more thoroughly between creation and curation." [162]
 
And that gives me yet another reason to love Japan apart from the cherry blossom, the literature, the beauty of the women, and the fact that - as noted by Barthes - it's a place in which symbols and signs play freely rather than begging to be interpreted or seeking to impose meaning. 
 
The thing with the Japanese fans is they have learnt not only the first rule of punk - do it yourself - but the equally important (but often forgotten) second rule - do it properly - and Reynolds rightly notes that what is striking about the Japanese take on Western pop forms is the fact they get everything so spot on thanks to "the unstinting attention to stylistic detail" [164]
 
The Japanese don't produce cheap copies, but perfect simulations; more real than the real thing and "liberated from the anchors of geography and history" [170] - it's the smile without the cat! I can't say I'm a fan of Shibuya-kei, but I certainly don't feel its practitioners and adherents are postmodern imperialists "whose fundamental mode of operation is the reprocessing of culture" [170] and who undermine the vitality and expressive power of genuine musical genres such as reggae, rap, and folk. 
 
"Once music is a reflection of esoteric knowledge rather than expressive urgency, its value is easily voided." [170] 
 
That is quite a claim. But whilst it's far from being merely an empty assertion - Reynolds has already assembled a good deal of evidence to support it - I'm still not entirely convinced by what remains ultimately a subjective claim and turning Japanese is not the worst fate that might befall a people. 
 
 
IX. 
 
Chapter 5 closes on quite a melancholy note:
 
"When I look back at the development of pop and rock during my lifetime [...] what perplexes me is the slow but steady fading of the artistic imperative to be original [...] from the mid-eighties onwards, gradually but with increasing momentum, that changed into an impulse to create something very much heard before, and moreover to do it immaculately, accurate in every last detail ..." [176]
 
This is what Reynolds means by the phrase turning Japanese - but as I say above, that's only an issue if you wish to continue valuing the ideals of originality; an ideal which, even in the West, was a relatively recent invention (as Reynolds well knows) [g]
  
"In some ways, pop music could be said to have held out against the onset of postmodernism the longest [...] the first decade of the twenty-first century is truly when the tide decisively turned Japanese. The cycles of recycling have a senseless quality, uncoupled from History [h] or a social reality beyond music [...] culture can be played for laughs [...] But it's the kind of slightly hysterical mirth that could easily turn to tears." [179]
 
Hopefully, Mr Reynolds can dry his eyes in time for Part Two of Retromania - 'Then' - which I will discuss in part 3 of this post ... 
 
 
Notes
 
[a] The history of the Clash can be bookended by two events: signing to CBS in January 1977 and being inducted into the Rock and Roll Hall of Fame in March 2003. They were always the only band that mattered - to the music industry! 
      Reynold's writes of the band's meek compliance and recalls seeing Mick Jones going up on stage at the award ceremony and looking like a "stoop-shouldered clerk shuffling to the podium to receive his retirement gift for forty-five years' loyal service to the firm" [10]. Ouch!
 
[b] Reynolds later expands on this line of thought: "History is a form of editing reality; for a historical account to work it requires a filter, otherwise the sheer sludge of information silts up the narrative flow." [28]
 
[c] See Nietzsche's essay 'On the uses and disadvantages of history for life', in Untimely Meditations, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 57-123. 
 
[d] Of course, it could be argued that the sprawling, over-documented, and often repetitive nature of the book is itself an ironic reflection of the indiscriminate chaos of the digital era that Reynold's describes.  
 
[e] Of course, I'm not suggesting Reynolds is a crypto-fascist, but, at the time of writing Retromania, he does display a conservative (almost reactionary) desire for affective realness and is clearly contemptuous of what Bob Harris famously called mock rock (with reference to the New York Dolls) in 1973. He also cites Oswald Spengler's Decline of the West (1918) and revives that hoary old dichotomy of culture versus civilisation (see page 170). 
      Ultimately, his rhetoric in Retromania is histrionic - and that's his term - because he treats the end of musical innovation as a cultural catastrophe and defends the idea that a people must move forward into the future - must progress - in order to remain healthy. 
      I'm told by someone who knows, that Reynolds explicitly frames his 2024 book Futuromania as a corrective to the cultural pessimism of Retromania and posits the idea that if you only find new ears with which to listen you can hear tomorrow's music today.   
 
[f] Of course, box sets aren't meant to be listened to; they are made for "ownership and display, as testaments to elevated taste and knowledge" [161] and monuments to the past. 
 
[g] Traditionally, there was no shame in copying and in fact copying the great masters was seen as crucial to the creative process. The modern concept of originality emerged primarily during the late 18th century, driven by the Romantic movement which championed individual genius and self-expression over imitation. 
      What surprises me is that Reynolds knows this, but still can't quite get over his "old modernist-minded post-punk" [173] prejudice - still remains a Romantic at heart who thinks it a sign of moral weakness or vital deficiency to not want to resist influence and produce original work; to find their own voice. "Not only has the anxiety of influence faded away," write Reynolds, "so has sense of shame about being derivative." [178]       
 
[h] Note the capitalisation of the term history - how very Hegelian! For most of us, history is simply a common noun referring to a chronological record of random events. But those who speak of History imagine the rational unfolding of Geist toward a specific goal. 
 
 

Retromania: Reviewed and Reassessed - Part 1: Introduction and Prologue

Simon Reynolds: Retromania
Faber and Faber (2012) 
 
 
I. 
 
This year marks the 15th anniversary of Simon Reynolds's celebrated book on pop culture's addiction to its own recent past: Retromania
 
So that seems like a good excuse to dust off my trusty yellow paperback edition [a] and reread its 450-odd pages divided into three main sections - the first two given the Savilesque titles 'Now' and 'Then' and the third designated 'Tomorrow' which, I suppose, is now our present - reassessing its arguments as I go along.   
 
Let's begin, however, by discussing the book's front matter: an Introduction that poses the crucial question: "Could it be that the greatest danger to the future of our music culture is ... its past?[ix]; followed by a Prologue which considers the concepts nostalgia and retro which are central to the study. 
 
 
II. 
 
I've always loved this opening sentence: "We live in a pop age gone loco for retro and crazy for commemoration." [ix] 
 
For whilst some younger readers might consider it inappropriate to casually use terms referring to mental health issues in such a jocular manner, I admire Reynolds's light-hearted writing style and do not believe for one moment that he's an ableist (though he does seem to also have a liking for the slang term lame, which is regrettable).
 
Like me, Reynolds belongs to another (perhaps less sensitive and politically less correct) generation; one that studied T. S. Eliot at school and so produces sentences such as "This is the way that pop ends, not with a BANG but with a box set ..." [ix] in an attempt to be amusing, not intellectually intimidating or elitist.
 
Still, we're here to discuss pop's loss of dynamic energy and temporal sluggishness, not Gen Z's wokeness and the shift in linguistic standards since 2011, so let's push on ...
 
It's hard not to agree with this:
 
"Instead of being the threshold to the future, the first ten years of the twenty-first century turned out to be [...] dominated by the 're-' prefix: revivals, reissues, remakes, re-enactments." [xi]
 
Or this:
 
"Too often with new young bands, beneath their taut skin and rosy cheeks you could detect the sagging grey flesh of old ideas." [xi]
 
And I suppose I understand (though don't quite share) Reynolds's (quasi-Nietzschean) anxiety about the "uses and abuses of the pop past" [xiii] and the way in which retro has become democratised and mainstream. For these days anyone can play with the past and dip into the historical dress-up box, whereas retro used to be the "preserve of aesthetes, connoisseurs and collectors" [xii], i.e., individuals who self-consciously expressed themselves "through pastiche and citation [...] combined with a sharp sense of irony" [xii-xiii].  
   
Reynolds is not quite saying that it's okay for wealthy, well-educated people to go in for period stylisation and antiquarianism, but unhealthy for the hoi polloi to be fascinated by the "fashions, fads, sounds and stars" [xiv] of their own youth, but he appears to regard retromania as a form of digital decadence leading us to the abyss. 
 
It feels, he says, "like we've reached some kind of tipping point" [xiv] and face cultural catastrophe; not just the end of pop music, but innovative new work in other areas too, such as theatre, film and fashion. Even toys and games and food fads are now retro: "But strangest of all is the demand for retro porn"
[xviii] [b].
 
Is that really so strange though? And is retro-consciousness really so wrong or harmful? 
 
I mentioned the almost Nietzschean feel to Reynolds's argument that pop music ought to be all about the present - that "the essence of pop is the exhortation to 'be here now', meaning both 'live like there's no tomorrow' and 'shed the shackles of yesterday'" [xix] - and this really does echo the German philosopher's insistence that history must serve the needs of life (with the latter understood to be creative, vigorous action in the present) [c]
 
Nietzsche's warning that an excess of historical knowledge can produce historisches Fieber and that this can paralyse individuals and cultures, is pretty much what Reynolds is warning of retromania. I suppose that this is why it's so vital that we have the capacity to forget. But in the era of YouTube - which he discusses in chapter 2 of his book - how can we ever do that? 
 
As Reynolds notes:   
 
"All the sound and imagery and information that used to cost money and physical effort to obtain is available for free [...] We've become victims of our ever-increasing capacity to store, organise, instantly access, and share vast amounts of cultural data." [xx-xxi]
 
 
I can't recall if Nietzsche blames any group of people in particular for the oversaturation of 19th century life with history - I think he holds the education system and German culture collectively responsible - but I do know Reynolds blames hipsters for inculcating retromania as the "dominant sensibility and creative paradigm" [xix] in the early 21st century: 
 
"The very people who you would once have expected to produce (as artists) or champion (as consumers) the non-traditional and the groundbreaking - that's the group who are most addicted to the past." [xix-xx]
 
 
After all, why be cutting-edge, when you can just press the replay button; why be a creator, when you can be a curator? "The avant-garde is now an arrière-garde" [xx] - for it's so much less demanding to fall back into the safety of the past than step forward into an unknown future.  
    
All this being said, Reynolds now adds an important qualification (and makes a necessary confession): 
 
"Retromania is not a straightforward denunciation of retro as a manifestation of cultural regression or decadence. How could it be, when I'm complicit myself [...] as a historian, as a reviewer of reissues, as a talking head in rock documentaries and as a sleeve note writer." [xxi]
 
Indeed, even as a music fan, he's complicit and as "addicted to retrospection as anybody" [xxii] - however, and this is why Reynolds can be characterised as a romantic optimist at heart - as much as he gives in to the "lure of the past", he pines (Mark Fisher-like) for "the future that's gone AWOL" [xxii]
 
In other words, Reynolds still believes that mañana es otro día ... If only because, deep down, he feels that retro is ultimately "lame and shameful" [xxiii] - the kind of informal moralism that his readers have come to anticipate. 
  
 
III.
 
Does anyone else find it a little odd (and a little unnecessary) to follow an introduction with a prologue in a work of non-fiction? Still, I'm not complaining; if Mr Reynolds wishes to further set the scene, define terms, and provide a little more (political and philosophical) context to his study, then that's fine with me.
 
His brief history of nostalgia as word and concept - starting as a spatial-geographical condition (the ache of displacement) before becoming a temporal condition (the longing for a lost time) - is certainly appreciated [d] and Reynolds is right to remind his readers that nostalgia "hasn't always served the forces of conservatism" [xxvi]; that radical movements often dream too of restoring a golden age.
 
But let's get back to the world of pop and one of the key passages in the Prologue:
 
"In the second half of the twentieth century, nostalgia became steadily more and more bound up with popular culture [... and] is now thoroughly entwined with the consumer-entertainment complex: we feel pangs for the products of yesteryear, the novelties and distractions that filled up our youth. Eclipsing individual pursuits (like hobbies) or participatory local activities (like amateur sports), the mass media and pop culture take up an ever-increasing proportion of our mental lives." [xxix-xxx] 

Memory, in other words, is now colonised and exploited by capitalism as a resource and the past is mined (rather than idealised or revered) as a source of pleasure and profit. It's not just pop that eats itself, we too cannibalise and consume our own lives; the symbol of retromania is surely the ouroboros (the serpent which swallows its own tail). 
 
But where does the term retro come from? Reynolds dismisses the idea that it's a linguistic spin-off of the Space Age and its retro-rockets and suggests, rather, that it is merely a detached prefix. He also stresses that for most people it's something of a dirty word; too associated with "camp, irony and mere trendiness" [xxxii]

I'm not quite sure why these things are thought more negatively than "musty, mouldering old stuff" [xxxii], but guess Reynolds is probably right to say that they signify "a shallow, surface-oriented attunement to style, as opposed to a deep, passionate love of a music scene's essence" [xxxii]
 
But that's precisely why, despite sharing some concerns, I would choose retro pop over prog rock and prefer to hang out at 430 King's Road rather than Louis Balfour's Jazz Club. Ultimately, this means rejecting even the austere monarchy of the Sex Pistols' Never Mind the Bollocks and privileging The Great Rock 'n' Roll Swindle in all its anarchic eclecticism [e].  
 
I suppose what I'm admitting here is that I prefer fashion, ideas, images, and chaos over music (be it recorded and played on the radio or performed live by the actual musicians), whilst strongly suspecting that Reynolds loves music above all other art forms and, indeed, all other things [f]. Which is fine: but it's where he and I differ and one can't help wondering if, in fact, retro isn't a moral and cultural danger, but a valid aesthetic form of its own ...? 

 
Notes
 
[a] All page references given in the main text are to this edition. 
 
[b] See the post: 'On the Pleasure of Queer Nostalgia' (3 April 2015): click here
 
[c] See Nietzsche's essay 'On the uses and disadvantages of history for life', in Untimely Meditations, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 57-123. See also Derrida's Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression, trans. Eric Prenowitz (The University of Chicago Press, 1995), a work cited by Reynolds - see the long footnote in bold on pp. 26-28.   
 
[d] I'm particularly grateful for the reference to Svetlana Boym's work on reflective nostalgia versus restorative nostalgia, in The Future of Nostalgia (Basic Books, 2002).  
 
[e] Reynolds makes much the same point I'm trying to make, but refers to the schism in the British folk scene between purists and those who are rather less militant in their asceticism; see pp. xxxiii-xxxv.    
 
[f] In an interview from way back in 2006, Reynolds attempts to explain why he has devoted so much of his time and energy to writing about music and taking music seriously (as opposed to literature or film). Partly, he says, it's because rock music was the most powerful cultural force when he was a teenager and partly it's because he believes music to be the most democratic art form. Also, there's something almost magical about music: 
      "It meshed with everything. It connected to politics, it connected to all the other arts [...] Music was [...] the thing that gave a bit extra to whatever you were doing and you wanted to have some connection to it. [...] Music was definitely both the centre of everything and what took you to other things and connected you to other things. [...] But, to me, music was the only thing really worth being excited about."
      See 'Simon Reynolds: interview by Wilson Neate', Part 1 of 2 (Feb 2006), in the online music magazine Perfect Sound Forever: click here.     
 
 
To read part 2 of this post on Retromania, please click here
 
Parts 3 and 4 will follow in due course ...


14 Feb 2026

Chillaxing with Danielle Mckinney (A Valentine's Day Post for Fatima)

Danielle Mckinney in her studio (2024) 
Photo: Danielle Mckinney / Marianne Boesky Gallery
 
I. 
 
According to an old friend, the French [1] isn't what it once was - but then, what is? 
 
Regardless of what anyone says, however, it's still a favourite haunt of mine: a place that maintains a bustling, vaguely bohemian atmosphere and much of its traditional charm; a place in which you can still strike up conversation with strangers and encounter interesting young women newly arrived from the Continent who are happy to discuss representations of the black female body in contemporary art ... 
 
Women such as Fatima, for example, whom I had the pleasure of meeting at the French a few nights ago, and who persuaded me that I should write a post on the African-American painter Danielle Mckinney, who, it seems, is the darling du jour of the artworld - though let me say at once I am not using this term to either denigrate her or dismiss her work, which, whilst not entirely to my tastes, is nevertheless deserving of critical attention, just as she is worthy of respect.  
 
 
II. 
 
Beginning her career within the visual arts as a photographer - for which she still has a passion - Mckinney has nevertheless really come into her own as a figurative painter, producing a series of canvases that are concerned with the inner experience of black womanhood and the way in which the complex interplay betweeen self-definition and external social construction produces cultural identity. 
 
In other words, Mckinney challenges the one-sided and simplistic idea that the latter is built solely upon appearance - skin tone, hair texture, body shape, etc. - and the perception of these traits by others. Black women are not just the racialised object of a male gaze, nor a fetishised figure within the white pornographic imagination; they are real beings and possess their own dreams, desires, and thoughts and needn't - as Du Bois would say - always look at themselves through the eyes of (judgemental) others. 
 
In a sense, Mckinney is demonstrating on canvas Toni Morrison's argument that the lives of black individuals - including black women - have depth and meaning and that black culture is its own  sovereign centre of knowledge and feeling. 
 
 
III.
 
Obviously, I'm a little ill at ease with the language of identity, self-hood, interiority, etc., and really don't want to go over a lot of old ground for the thousandth time. 
 
So probably best we just leave all that to one side and say something about the paintings themselves which depict black women in private moments; smoking, lounging, or reflecting quietly on things (i.e., reclaiming their time and agency) - what has been described as the politics of rest (contra the politics of resistance); something I'm sure Roland Barthes would approve of [2].  
  
What I think most interests me about the pictures - apart from their politics - is the fact that Mckinney has a thing for dark backgrounds and allows her figures to emerge from such [3], almost as if to suggest that Blackness is born of darkness and retains an element of such, much like an object always retains its mystery and potency thanks to the fact that is largely hidden and withdrawn and never obscenely exposed or transparent.   
 
Objects never give themselves away and the figures in Mckinney's paintings never give themselves away either (even if she and her critics insist on speaking about the pictures opening windows on to the black female soul). There's an intimacy about her canvases, but no spectacle and if there's symbolism and narrative what really appeals (to me at least) is the silence and stillness. They have presence and one enters into a relationship with them, but one needn't stare at them trying to extract their meaning or make the subjects speak either to us or for us. 
 
 
IV. 
 
And as for the lovely Fatima - my new friend from the French - she's a living example of the sort of strong and independent woman Mckinney loves to immortalise on canvas; one who emerged not from the bright blue sea like a Botticelli Venus, but from the blackness of a Soho night ...    
  
 
Notes
 
[1] The French House is a tiny bar and dining room at 49 Dean Street, Soho, London, long popular with artists, actors, and writers; no pints, no phones, no music, and almost no chance of a seat after six. Click here to visit their website. 
 
[2] I'm thinking here of Barthes's late concept of le Neutre; a refusal to participate in the world of militant activity and ideological posturing and a withdrawl from the arrogance and assumption of the world. Why be bullied into taking a stand or passing judgement when you can sit quietly by the window and look out at the birds in the garden, or go for a short nap? One of the many things we can learn from objects is the art of withdrawal and how to evade the paradigm. See Roland Barthes, The Neutral, trans. Rosalind E. Krauss and Denis Hollier (Columbia University Press, 2007).
 
[3] As one commentator notes, Mckinney had previously tried priming her canvases with white and brown, but nothing felt right until she hit on the idea of painting them black and allowing the figures to emerge as if from a photographic darkroom or an eternal twilight. See Veronica Esposito,'"Women are not usually seen to be resting": Danielle Mckinney's portraits of repose', in The Guardian (17 April 2024): click here.  
 
 
To read more about Mckinney and see a selection of her work and press interviews, etc., please visit the Marianne Boesky Gallery website: click here and/or the Galerie Max Hetzler website: click here
      
Alternatively, readers might like to check out Mckinney's Instagram page: @danielle_mckinney_
 
 

12 Feb 2026

Granny Takes a Trip with Gorman & Bracewell

Poster for the Granny Takes a Trip book event at Foyles (11 Feb 2026) 
Photo of Paul Gorman live on stage taken by Melpomeni 

 
 
I. In Anticipation ...
  
Much anticipating this evening's event at Foyles on the Charing Cross Road: Paul Gorman in conversation with Michael Bracewell; i.e., two of the UK's most celebrated pop culture writers [1] under one roof - and all for the price of a tenner (which includes a glass of wine). 
 
Essentially, they'll be discussing the look of music and the sound of fashion in relation to Granny Takes a Trip; the groovy London boutique that was opened sixty years ago this month on King's Road, Chelsea, by Nigel Waymouth, his girlfriend Sheila Cohen, and John Pearse.
 
Gorman recently published his illuminating study of the shop as well as the cultural scene from which it emerged [2], so obviously he'll be there in part to promote (and sign) copies of this book, but I'm sure he'll be willing to discuss also McLaren and Westwood's store which opened nearby a few years later and for which Granny paved the way and provided a model (like McLaren and Westwood's shop, Granny Takes a Trip became famous for its changing façade, interior, and styles of fashion).    
 
At least I hope so, as it's the punk store at 430 King's Road rather than the hippie haven at 488 that really excites my interest.    


II. On Reflection ... 
 
Well, that was fun!
 
Gorman is an engaging speaker and it helps when the interlocutor is deeply knowledgeable of the subject being discussed. The event was also nicely staged and managed by the staff at Foyles, so kudos to them. 

If I had a time machine and could only make one return trip, I'd still use it to visit SEX in 1976 rather than Granny's in 1966, but, to be fair, the latter was a more culturally vital space than I previously realised (even if listed on the wrong side of the bed).    

Members of a receptive and fairly large audience produced one or two interesting observations and although I didn't ask at the time, I came away wondering whether a store such as Granny Takes a Trip or SEX would still be possible today ... 
 
Sadly, I doubt it. 
 
Although whether that's because socio-cultural conditions have changed, or we have fundamentally changed as a people - become less imaginative and less daring and more desirous of safe spaces in which to self-identify, rather than zones of indiscernibility in which to dress up so as to mess up and become-other - I'm not sure.

Time was, in the 1960s and '70s, when any suburban teenager could go up to London, stroll along the King's Road or cruise round Soho, and (momentarily at least) leave their mundane life behind; could visit magical boutiques and try on an outfit like Mr Benn and be transported into a fantasy adventure.  
 
Now the young go to Primark or spend the day in Westfield and talk about the importance of diversity and being themselves whilst all looking (to my eyes at least) exactly the same in their casual street wear (baggy, low-rise jeans, oversized hoodies, trainers, etc.); a look that is heavily influenced by social media trends rather than the politics of style.  

 
Notes
 
[1] Paul Gorman (b. 1959) is a writer it would be easy to envy, but whom I prefer to love and admire; particularly for his 2020 biography of McLaren, but also for his work in a variety of other areas as a brilliant curator and, indeed, pop cultural map-maker.  
      Michael Bracewell (b. 1958) is a writer with whose life and work I am far less familiar, but whose two collections of essays - England Is Mine: Pop Life in Albion From Wilde to Goldie (1997) and The Space Between: Selected Writings on Art (2012) - I plan on reading in the near future. 
 
[2] Paul Gorman, Granny Takes a Trip: High Fashion and High Times at the Wildest Rock 'n' Roll Boutique (White Rabbit Books, 2025). 
      The publisher's blurb reads: 
 "Granny Takes A Trip was more than just a shop and a fashion brand; it was the original rock and roll clothes boutique, the template for all that followed. What started as an odd retail venture/art installation in a depressed part of London known as World's End became an international byword for glam decadence in Manhattan and Hollywood, combining flamboyant style and all manner of countercultural activity ...
      Unfolding over a decade-and-a-half, this tumultuous story invokes a cast of often unique, sometimes entitled, unusually talented and troubled individuals on a collective mission to shake up austere, repressed, class-ridden Britain and white bread America." 
      The book can be ordered here.  
 
 
This post is for Paul and Charlie's dark-haired Angels: Maria, Meni, and Jennifer. 
 
 

10 Feb 2026

Psychology 101 (Notes on Narcissistic Rumination, etc.)

 
 
'We are unknown to ourselves, we men of knowledge - and with good reason. 
For we have never sought to stick our tails in our mouths.'  
 
 
I. 
 
I've heard it said that self-reflection is crucial for personal growth and that personal growth is vital for enhancing self-awareness, thus creating a kind of positive psychological loop, which, for those content to sit with their tails in their mouths [1], is all fine and dandy. 
 
It is not, however, something that appeals to those of a Nietzschean bent who think more in terms of radical self-overcoming rather than bourgeois self-improvement and celebrate innocence and forgetfulness rather than indulge in narcissistic rumination
 
Clearly, there are a lot of terms to unpack here. But, without wishing to turn what was intended to be a bright and breezy post into a lengthy psychology lecture, let me offer some clarification ...
 
 
II. 
 
By self-overcoming (Selbstüberwindung), Nietzsche refers to a process via which an individual (or a people) might abandon what they are and enter into what Deleuze and Guattari describe as a becoming-other (devenir-autre), thereby distilling Nietzsche's psychological insights into a more radical ontological concept. This is not a one-time event, but a constant process or unfolding that aims for a new way of thinking and feeling, rather than a development of the same. 
      
Ultimately, of course, if you subscribe to a philosophy of difference, there is no originary or essential self to overcome in the traditional sense; instead, there is only a site where different forces (active or reactive) interact and becoming is the process by which these forces shift and mutate, breaking away from static identities and fixed categories. 
     
 
III. 
 
When Nietzsche writes in Zarathustra of innocence and forgetfulness - I think he uses the German terms Unschuld and Vergessen - he refers to the childlike state reached when an individual has fully stylised an ethical model of self beyond good and evil (i.e., fixed moral values). 
      
Innocence, as used here, is not a form of naivety or ignorance, but rather the ability to affirm life as is (what he terms an economy of the whole), without qualification. Forgetfulness, meanwhile, acts as a necessary (and active) capacity to absorb past experiences and not be weighed down by personal history or the spirit of gravity; to be free of ressentiment
 
When working in conjunction, innocence and forgetfulness allows, if you like, for a fresh start and to make an affirmation of life that is both joyful and playful.
      
 
IV.
 
By narcissistic rumination I refer to an obsessive thought-cycle that locks the subject into a fixed state of neurosis and ultimately results in paralysis by analysis [2]. Narcissistic ruminators are thus those unfortunate individuals who spend a great deal of time and energy attempting to make sense of chaos; i.e., to find patterns or structures of meaning to which they are central. They love asking: Why me? [3]
 
Such individuals also love, à la Miss Haversham, recycling old conversations so that they might finally get others to admit their logical inconsistency and take ownership of their moral failings (there's nothing narcissistic ruminators enjoy more than making others feel miserable about themselves).   
     
 
V. 
 
And finally, re the idea that self-reflection can be dangerous - can lead to paralysis by analysis - let me admit that this needn't always be the case and that there are, I suppose, benefits to be had from knowing something about the self (even if it's only that the self is a convenient fiction rooted in grammar). 
 
However, it can become detrimental to wellbeing when the would-be self-knower falls into the black hole of narcissistic rumination; i.e., when they swallow their own tail and dwell on toxic negativity; when they become so obsessed on evaluating past events and collecting grievances that they become unable to act (or even smile) in the present. 
 
 
VI. 
 
In sum: Nietzscheans never ask why and rarely ruminate; they leave that to those who seek that highly suspect type of self-knowledge dreamed of by Platonists, Christians, Jungians, and other idealistic herd animals [4]
 
 
Notes
 
[1] See D. H. Lawrence, 'Him With His Tail in His Mouth', in Reflections on the Death of a Porcupine and Other Esssays, ed. Michael Herbert (Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 307-317. 
      In this short essay, written in 1925, Lawrence humorously attacks closed, self-referential styles of thinking and the obsession with interiority. With reference to the figure of the ouroboros, he also challenges the idea that the end is one with the beginning (i.e., that infinity is some kind of perfect cycle).
 
[2] Hamlet, of course, is the poster child for this idea of paralysis by analysis; a man whose 'powers of action have been eaten up by thought', as Hazlitt says in his landmark study Characters in Shakespeare's Plays (1817).   
 
[3] See the recent post 'Why Me Contra So What' (6 Feb 2026): click here
      Referring once more to literature, then Melville's Captain Ahab might be said to be the ultimate narcissistic ruminator. For he cannot view the loss of his leg as a random, natural event. Instead, he anthropomorphises the great white whale, convinced it acted with inscrutable malice specifically against him. He spends his life ruminating on this personal grievance, making himself the tragic centre of a cosmic drama. 
 
[4] Before I'm accused of being reductive by grouping Platonists, Christians, and Jungians together in this manner, let me indicate my awareness of the fact that these traditions have different understandings of the self and of what constitutes knowledge of the self, and different reasons for wanting to attain such knowledge. 
      However, all three traditions, it seems to me, consider the unexamined life to be a very bad thing - devoid of value, meaning, purpose, etc. - and each tradition suggests that failure to know the self will have negative consequences. I'm not adopting Thomas Gray's position here - ignorace is bliss - but I do think that innocence and forgetfulness, as discussed above, can make happy and free (inasmuch as anything can ever make us happy and free).  
 
 

9 Feb 2026

Notes on a Psychodrama: A Guest Post by Ronald S. Foelles

Psychodramatists: 
Stephen Alexander and Simon Solomon
 
 
I. 
 
I have been following the recent (often acrimonious) exchange between Stephen Alexander and Simon Solomon in the comments section of Torpedo the Ark following the post titled 'Why Me Contra So What' (6 Feb 2026): click here.  
 
And whilst I have no wish to become embroiled in what is clearly a lovers' spat between the two as much as it is a philosophical debate, I thought it might be helpful to offer some objective third party observations.
 
Ultimately, what we see unfolding here is a textbook clash between a defender of secular reason (Alexander) and a defender of sacred wisdom (Solomon). What complicates matters somewhat is that Alexander understands reason from a Nietzschean perspective (as a gay science), whilst Solomon wishes to ground his faith in analytic psychology which he regards as a form of empiricism. 
 
 
II. 
 
Whilst Solomon appears the more learned of the two - dropping not one, not two, but four Ancient Greek terms for fate early into the discussion and providing a wealth of textual support for his arguments - I feel that Alexander nevertheless holds his ground and presents his case in a more concise and open manner (even if it is sometimes shot through with sarcasm as well as scepticism). 
 
Both men, it seems to me, are unnecessarily aggressive; although as they both graduated from the Philosophy Department at Warwick University in the 1990s, that is perhaps understandable. Whilst Alexander retains a veneer of calm and coolness, he still manages to weaponise such in order to antagonise the more hot-under-the-collar figure of Solomon. 
 
It's hard to say who is the most dismissive and condescending, but whilst Alexander is more mocking, Solomon is certainly more abusive and also more pedantic - in a debate of this kind, Simon, a spelling error really doesn't matter. 
 
Solomon also likes to pathologise his opponent; that is to say, instead of refuting Alexander's logic, he attempts to discredit it by suggesting it is a symptom of mental or emotional deficiency: You only think that way because you're a damaged individual! He doesn't want to win the argument, but shame his opponent and expose them as an inferior (and possibly a fraud).    
 
To be fair to Solomon, however, I think his defensiveness stems from a perceived threat to his identity founded upon the mysterious and imaginative sensibility of the poet. Thus, when Alexander reduces his compellingly empirical experiences to mere statistical inevitability, Solomon is offended at the core of his being. 
 
The odd thing is that whilst neither seems particularly fond of the other, their familiarity suggests they are long-term friends. 
 
 
III. 
 
Were I to move from my role as unofficial moderator to unofficial adjudicator and choose between the two - in terms not so much of their ideas, but their writing style and public persona - I'd probably have to favour the somewhat mercurial figure of Alexander.
 
For the latter writes with a lot less seriousness and doesn't sermonise in an ex-cathedra manner like Solomon; there's more sunlight and fresh air in Alexander's texts and less metaphysical solemnity. His use of slang and colloquialism can be a little wearisome at times - when he tries a little too hard to be the cheeky chappie - but, again, I prefer his playful irony to Solomon's haughtiness.          
 
Thanks to short, pithy sentences, it's easy to follow Alexander's arguments. Solomon's construction of a complex textual labyrinth, on the other hand, can leave one feeling a little lost and confused (although, to be fair, Solomon does produce some very powerful and very beautiful turns of phrase). 
 
Just as there are times when one wants to tell Alexander to knock off the performative game and be serious, so too are there times when one wishes one could tell Solomon that the fate of the world's soul isn't always hanging in the balance and he isn't the appointed guardian of ineffable mystery.
 
If he isn't careful, Solomon is, ironically, in danger of something Jung often warned about: inflation, i.e., over-identification with an archetype; in this case that of the Sage or Poet-Priest. 
 
He should thus be grateful to Alexander, for the latter occupies the role of his shadow; i.e. the one who obliges him to confront those parts of himself he has repressed in order to construct an ideal (if somewhat monstrous) post-Romantic persona.  
 

8 Feb 2026

Prince, Oh Prince of Darkness: Notes on the Case of Peter Mandelson

Lord Peter Mandelson 
(The Prince of Darkness) 
 
'He who knows not that the Prince of Darkness is also the King of Light, knows nothing ...'  
 
 
I. 
 
The Prince of Darkness is a term used in John Milton's epic poem Paradise Lost (1667) [1], referring to Satan as the embodiment of evil. 
 
It is an English translation of the Latin phrase princeps tenebrarum, which occurs in the Gospel of Nicodemus (aka the Acts of Pilate), thought to have been written in the 4th or 5th century. 
 
It is, in my view, by far the loveliest of Satan's titles - much nicer than Lord of the Flies - one which makes the Devil sound like a true gentleman [2], whereas Beelzebub suggests some sort of exalted dustman.
 
The Prince of Darkness, however, is also one of the nicknames given to the Labour Party politician, lobbyist and diplomat, Peter Mandelson, who - as many readers will know - is back in the headlines at the moment ...
 
 
II. 
 
Mandelson's long (and hugely successful) career has famously been marked by controversy, which resulted in his twice resigning from the Cabinet and recently being dismissed as British Ambassador to the United States, after a scandal emerged concerning his friendship with Jeffrey Epstein, an American financier and convicted child sex offender who died, in somewhat fishy circumstances, whilst in his prison cell, in 2019 [3].    
 
To be honest, before this latest scandal I knew very little about Mandelson (and cared even less). But now, knowing a bit more, I find I'm increasingly sympathetic; I certainly prefer him to Starmer, whether or not he passed on sensitive government information to Epstein and whether or not he's a corrupt moral monster of some sort.     
 
In fact, for me there's something a bit Wildean about Mandelson, as well as something diabolical. For like Wilde, Mandelson is outrageously reckless in the face of danger and forever flirting with scandal (behaviour driven, I'm told by a friend of mine who knows about this sort of thing, by a combination of psychological factors, including arrogance, hubris, and a belief in his own exceptionality).  
 
 
III.
 
Of course, I'm by no means the first to feel this way about Mandelson (to be taken in by his seductive charm, if you like).  
 
Way back in 2001, the innovation expert and social policy consultant Charles Leadbeater wrote a piece in The Guardian on his friend Mandelson, whom, he said, was an inspired political visionary who enriches British public life.   
 
Mandelson, Leadbeater continued, could think outside the box and had the "stamina, professionalism and attention to detail" [4] to push through significant change: "He made things happen when many around him simply talked. He was not afraid to take on fights when more cautious and calculating souls cowered." [5] 
 
Conceding that Mandelson has certain character flaws - including vanity and arrogance - Leadbeater points out that this is true of most politicians. And so, what if he likes the high life and his head is too easily turned by the rich and famous - at least he isn't boring and he dares to be different:
 
"That is why I like and support Peter Mandelson. In a political class marked by its limited imagination, Peter had the capacity not just to think big, but to deliver as well. He dared to stand up and stand out. Now he has been hammered back into place. The Oscar Wilde of modern politics, he embraced the establishment and challenged convention in the same movement. Those who were unsettled by his daring are the ones celebrating this weekend." [6]
 
That is a paragraph which is both uncannily resonant and extraordinarily pertinent to the present discussion of the Mandelson case.   
 
 
IV.  
 
In closing, I would like to refer readers to a spoof piece in The Daily Mash informing us that as well as losing his government post and stepping down from the House of Lords, Mandelson "will no longer be referred to as the Prince of Darkness or enjoy the benefits of the title [...] because he is a terrible representative of Satanism and the hellish underworld" [7].  
 
Continuing in the same satirical manner, the article quotes a spokesman who confirms that Mandelson has "disgraced the good name of the Devil" [8] by fawning over Epstein, rather than fulfilling his public duty of challenging God's authority and leading others into temptation. Thus, from now on Mandelson will no longer be able to possess souls, "shapeshift, or control the dead" [9].  

 
Notes
 
[1] See Book 10, line 383: click here to read online (The John Milton Reading Room).   
 
[2] See Shakespeare's King Lear (1606), Act III, scene IV, line 151: "The Prince of Darkness is a gentleman." Click here to read online (Folger Shakespeare Library). 
 
[3] Mandelson's friendship with Epstein, which had been publicly known about for some years, spanned at least from 2002 to 2011 (i.e., it had continued even after Epstein's 2008 conviction in Florida for soliciting prostitution from a minor).
 
[4-6] Charles Leadbeater, 'My friend the political visionary', in The Guardian (28 Jan 2001): click here.  
 
[7-9] See the article 'Peter Mandelson stripped of Prince of Darkness title', in The Daily Mash (6 Feb 2026): click here.  
 
Musical bonus: Bow Wow Wow performing their 1981 single 'Prince of Darkness' on German TV: click here to watch on YouTube (80s Rec.)