On the Rise and Fall of Because

Image adapted from the sleeve to the Killing Joke album 

What's THIS for ...! (E.G. / Polydor Records, 1981) [1]

 

"He shall fall down into the pit called Because,

and there he shall perish with the dogs of Reason." [2]

 

 

I. 

 

Although the Age of Reason didn't really establish itself until a few hundred years later, it was already assembling its vocabulary in the late 14th-century, including that crucial term because, which enters into English at this date modelled on the French phrase par cause. 

 

It's one of those words that people who love the abstract concept of causality - i.e., the capacity of a to determine b - often use to close down further discussion: There's no point arguing because the facts clearly demonstrate ... 

 

Because is thus the ultimate explanation - the metaphysical answer to the equally metaphysical question why? - and it has become implicit in the logic and structure of everyday language. Indeed, one might even, like Nietzsche, suggest that it betrays the presence of God within language ... [3]

 

 

II.

 

However, those of us who have long been anticipating the fall of because - by which we mean the overcoming of metaphysics, rather than the abolition of reason - are amused by a recent development in the English speaking world that has got some grammar nazis upset ... 

 

For it seems that because is now being used in an ironic manner by the young to convey a certain vagueness about the exact reasons for anything. Thus, whereas traditionally, because is a subordinating conjunction which connects two parts of a sentence in which one (the subordinate) explains the other, now it's being used as a preposition (i.e. placed before nouns, verbs, adjectives, and interjections). 

 

And this new usage, not yet widespread but increasingly common - because social media - in some sense subverts the word's old grammatical function and authority, exposing the fact that we realise there's nothing we can really refer back to as a causal agent or fixed and final explanation of the world's chaos and mystery; i.e., that we know our rationale is often - like God - just a linguistic fiction that we hold on to because convenient and because comforting [4].   

 

As Megan Garber writes in The Atlantic, the word because hasn't fallen so much as exploded; it can now be used however the speaker chooses to use it, limited only by the confines of their own imagination: "So we get [...] people using 'because' not just to explain, but also to criticize, and sensationalize, and ironize [...]" [5]

 

 

 

III.     

 

So, what does all this signify exactly? That we're living in a post-Nietzschean (and post-Derridean) universe? Or that the Aeon of Horus has arrived as Aleister Crowley announced? 

Possibly. 

 

Or it could just mean that a generation who have grown up texting and tweeting are so lazy (and self-absorbed) that they can't be bothered to finish their thoughts and sentences, or waste time providing long and complex explanations: because emoji and the will to abbreviate ...?   

 

Notes

 

[1] The Killing Joke album What's THIS for ...! (1981) is one of the great post-punk albums and the opening track of Side A - 'The Fall of Because' - is a personal favourite. I'm assuming they took the title of the song from a line by Aleister Crowley (see note 2 below). Click here to listen to the 2005 digitally remastered version provided to YouTube by Universal Music Group.    

 

[2] Aleister Crowley, The Book of the Law (1909), II. 27. See also III. 20, where Crowley actually uses the phrase 'fall of because'.

      For those who don't know, this work - often referred to by enthusiasts with the Classical Latin title Liber AL vel Legis - is the central sacred text of Crowley's new religion (Thelema). According to Crowley, it was dictated to him by a supernatural being who called himself Aiwass, speaking through his new wife, Rose Edith Kelly, during their honeymoon in Egypt, in 1904. 

      With publication of this text, Crowley announced the arrival of a new phase in the spiritual evolution of mankind, to be known as the Aeon of Horus. The key teaching of the book - and this new age - is: Do what thou wilt shall be the whole of the Law, meaning that adherents of Thelema should seek out and follow their own singular path in life (like a star). 

      As for what Crowley means by the fall of because, I suspect he's simply indicating that the Age of Horus is post-Enlightenment and thus open to the possibility that there are more things in heaven and earth than are understood within the framework of modern science, or Western reason.       

 

[3] See Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, where he famously writes in the chapter entitled 'Reason in Philosophy' (5): "I fear we are not getting rid of God because we still believe in grammar ..."

       For Nietzsche, our faith in causal relationships (as a form of agency) is based upon a number of mistaken beliefs and correcting these four great errors will play a significant part in what he terms the revaluation of all values. 

      The reason, says Nietzsche, that we like to think events have causes (and actions have actors behind them), is because it's reassuring. Further, to trace something unknown (and thus threatening) back to something we can explain and make familiar is empowering. Essentially, we look to find ourselves in everything (even in God). See the chapter entitled 'The Four Great Errors', in Twilight of the Idols.   

   

[4] See note 3 above.

 

[5] Megan Garber, 'English Has a New Preposition, Because Internet', The Atlantic (19 Nov 2013): click here to read online. Readers interested in this topic might also like the post entitled 'Because and effect' (21 July 2014) by Patricia T. O'Conner and Stewart Kellerman on their Grammarphobia blog: click here.

 

 

The Study of Myth is an Occupation for Imbeciles

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I.

It's always worth remembering to whom Nietzsche dedicated the first edition of Human, All Too Human (1878): it wasn't Schopenhauer and it wasn't Wagner; it was Voltaire. 

And whilst there are very few references to Voltaire in Nietzsche's writings after this date, he always remained well-disposed towards this giant of the Enlightenment, describing him in Ecce Homo (1888) as a grand seigneur of the spirit in whom he sees a crucial aspect of himself.   

II.

Perhaps even more surprising than the dedication in Human, All Too Human to Voltaire was the inclusion of a passage - in lieu of a preface - taken from Descartes's Discourse on Method (1637) in praise of reason. 

All of which indicates that it's lazy and mistaken to characterise Nietzsche as an irrationalist, as many of his opponents (and, indeed, many of his supporters) have done. He wasn't - even if there are many passages in his work that lend themselves to an irrationalist interpretation.

Nor, having realised the error of his ways in The Birth of Tragedy (1872), was Nietzsche a mythologist.

If, in this dubious work, he asserted that "without myth all culture loses its healthy and natural creative power" [1], by 1876 he understood that the conditions no longer existed for myth to function in this way; not least because its narratives were no longer considered to have any significant truth content:    

"If an epoch has thought beyond the realm of myths, a breach has occurred which fundamentally alters a society's relationship to myths. Their value dwindles and is perhaps replaced by aesthetic value. However, myths considered from an aesthetic point of view cannot maintain the impact required to consolidate a 'cultural movement' into a state of unity." [2]

Safranski continues:

"Nietzsche grew aware that [...] eras of the past could be conjured up in the mind, but that their renaissance could be enacted only at the cost of self-deception. A modern mythical consciousness is hollow; it represents systematized insincerity." [3]

It becomes, in other words, a will to aesthetic self-enchantment; or, in a word, Wagnerian. And Nietzsche had already begun to recognise what lay behind this word even before the shock and disappointment he experienced at Bayreuth in 1876, where he saw for himself how even supposedly sacred art rests on cheap scenery and costumes.

Whereas Nietzsche had once shared Wagner's goal of overcoming modernity and bringing about a rebirth of tragedy from out of the spirit of music, he now regarded this as an impossible - and undesirable - fantasy; an attempt to lie one's way into madness.

From 1876 on, Nietzsche refuses to employ philosophy to "nullify reason and dream his way into an aesthetic myth" [4]. And from this date on, he agreed with Voltaire that l'étude du mythe est une occupation pour les imbéciles ...

Notes

[1] Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, ed. Michael Tanner, trans. Shaun Whiteside, (Penguin Books, 1993), p. 109. 

[2] Rüdiger Safranski, Nietzsche, trans. Shelley Frisch, (Granta Books, 2002), p. 140.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid., p. 141. 

This post is a revised extract from 'On the Abuses and Disadvantages of Mythology for Life: A Timely Meditation', in Stephen Alexander, Visions of Excess and Other Essays, (Blind Cupid Press, 2010), pp. 219-253.  

For a related post (also extracted from the above essay) on myth and literary criticism, click here.