Polo: the mint with the hole
Photo by Conell on Flickr (9 April 2018)
I.
As a child and natural born nihilist, absence always excited more than presence (not necessarily making the heart grow fonder, but the head spin faster); holes, slits, and cracks always fascinated more than wholeness and smooth impenetrability. Pulling the plug was always a much greater pleasure than filling the tub with water.
And the philosophy of negativity still appeals to me today; I spend an inordinate amount of time watching shadows in the darkness and listening to the silence. Althought whether nothingness is an actual feature of ontological reality or one that we merely imagine due to the way we think and speak (i.e., a conceptual fiction rooted in language), I don't really know and, to be honest, don't really care [1].
II.
Funnily enough, the idea that we can perceive absences is becoming increasingly popular in contemporary culture - and not just amongst philosophers. People seem to be waking up to the fact that whilst how things are matters, so too is it equally vital how things are not and that being rests upon non-being.
In other words, people seem to be responding to the call of the void [2] in ever greater numbers and I have to admit I smiled when I came across an essay written in 2017 by Dan Cavedon-Taylor which argued that we can tactually perceive the absence of a tooth after the dentist has performed an extraction - for wasn't I saying much the same thing in the very first post published here on Torpedo the Ark five years ealier [3].
Namely, that the sense of loss is palpable and that a rotten tooth - even after removal -
continues to function as a provocation and invisible presence.
Thinkers in both the European and Anglo-American traditions of philosophy have accepted the truth of this. Even Bertrand Russell - about as far away from Heidegger in both philosophical methods and concerns as one can get - conceded that there must exist negative facts.
However, there remain those who argue that "although we can experience absences, and although our absence experiences are often triggered by perceptual experiences, absence experiences are not themselves a perceptual phenomenon" [4] and warn we should not be seduced by those thinkers who suggest otherwise and commit themselves to "the reality of negative features in the world and our ability to perceive them" [5].
Thinkers such as Roy Sorensen, for example ...
III.
Sorensen's work on negative reality [6] - things that are paradoxically present by their absence - tries a bit too hard to be quirky and fun and so quickly starts to irritate, but, nevertheless, he's got some interesting things to say on shadows and holes, for example, and I'm vaguely sympathetic with his attempt to persuade others that these things are entities in their own right (and not just mental constructs that result from human experience and expectation - which was Sartre's position).
I'm not entirely convinced that the hole in a Polo mint can be perceived independently of the matter that surrounds it, but I would certainly agree that the hole cannot be defined purely in terms of the mint sweet; it's an objective feature in itself and to deny this just seems a little silly and a form of metaphysical prejudice that thinks presence is the be-all and end-all and absence of no positive importance or reality because seemingly less tangible.
Notes
[1] This is clearly a question that continues to trouble many
philosophers, however, including Stephen Mumford, who peddles a form of soft Parmenideanism in his recent book Absence and Nothing: the philosophy of what there is not, (Oxford University Press, 2021).
For Mumford, the pre-Socratic philosopher Parmenides was largely correct to say that the division into Being and non-Being is a false rather than a fundamental division as what exists is everything whilst what does not exist is nothing. For Pamenides, to believe in the existence of both Being and non-Being is contradictory and makes knowledge impossible. He also insists that Being is eternal and indivisible.
Unlike Parmenides, however, Mumford does not think that being is essentially fixed and unchanging and he does not rule out the possibility of being able to think about what there is not and even that there might - under certain circumstances - be some form of negative entity that would have to be acknowledged (if only as a theoreticl anomaly).
Thus, Mumford can, in this way, have his cake and eat it; maintaining his argument that absence and nothingness are not an ontological part of everyday reality, whilst still writing a 200 page monograph on the subject. That's not to dismiss his methodology, but simply point out the convenient nature of making a compromise of this kind.
[2] I don't mean to suggest more and more people have the urge to jump from atop a tall building, but that more and more people are waking up the fact that the void is a space of forgotten possibility and future potential and so has vital existential reality. See my recently published post on this (22 October 2025): click here.
[3] See Dan Cavedon-Taylor, 'Touching Voids: On the Varieties of Absence Perception', in Review of Philosophy and Psychology, Vol. 8, Issue 2, (2017), pp. 355–366. The post on TTA that I refer to is 'Reflections on the Loss of UR6' (24 Nov 2012): click here.
Cavedon-Taylor and myself are in agreement that after having a tooth pulled - and after the anaesthetic wears off - the first thing you do is run your tongue along your teeth until arriving at the gap where once a tooth was located: "The gap is experienced as unnerving, and not merely on its initial probing […] Something once experienced as present within your mouth is now experienced as lacking."
[4] Laura Gow, 'A New Theory of Absence Experience', in the European Journal of Philosophy Vol. 29, Issue 1, (March 2021), pp. 168-181. To read online, click here.
And see also Gow's paper entitled 'Empty Space, Silence, and Absence' in the
Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 51, Issue 7, (October 2021), pp. 496-507. Published online by Cambridge University Press (March 2022): click here.
In this text, Gow examines two experiences which some philosophers have claimed (mistakenly, in her view) to be paradigmatic examples of absence experience: the experience of empty space and the experience of silence. For Gow, "even if we can see empty space and hear silence [...], such experiences cannot be used in support of the perceptual view of absence experience".
[5] Stephen Mumford, Absence and Nothing: the philosophy of what there is not, p. 2.
[6] See for example his book Seeing Dark Things: The Philosophy of Shadows (Oxford University Press, 2008); or his more recent study, Nothing: A Philosophical History (Oxford University Press, 2022).
