Showing posts with label villainy of things. Show all posts
Showing posts with label villainy of things. Show all posts

4 May 2024

Objects Make Happy

Taffy From the Objects Make Happy series
 (SA/2024) [1]
 
 
I. 
 
At the heart of Graham Harman's object-oriented philosophy is the notion of allure.
 
Allure, says Harman, is something that "exists in germinal form in all reality, including the inanimate sphere" [2] and is the key to all causation
 
Allure is the way that objects - which are fundamentally withdrawn  - signal to one another from across the void: "Allure is the presence of objects to each other in absent form." [3] 
 
I love that sentence and love this (rather ghostly) theory. 
 
We may never be able to know an object in itself (i.e., in the fullness of its reality), but we can still come into touch with them and they can still affect us in a variety of ways, not always positively or in a manner that is beneficial to us; I have written elsewhere about the malevolent aspect of objects and what Byung-Chul Han terms the villainy of things [click here]. 
 
But, more often than not, they make happy, which is why when I think of happiness I think of objects [4].  
 
 
II.
 
The feminist writer and critical theorist Sara Ahmed - author of The Cultural Politics of Emotion (2004) - has a fascinating take on happiness and objects in terms of affect theory
 
According to Ahmed, there is a sustained (and sticky) connection between our emotions and objects and it's important to realise that happiness, for example, "starts from somewhere other than the subject" [5]
 
In other words, to feel happy is to be randomly (but intimately) touched by something; it comes from outside; it's an inner state triggered by external objects (which may include other people, or cats, but which also includes plants, stars, and ideas). Ultimately, happiness is contingent, not essential [6].
 
Of course, as Ahmed points out, as we change over time - as our bodies age, for example - "the world around us will create different impressions" [7] and what makes happy one day may no longer be experienced as so delightful the next; Locke famously talks of the man who loves and then no longer loves grapes [8].
 
Having said that, some objects hold our affection and bring joy across an entire lifetime; I can't imagine a time when Taffy, pictured above, wouldn't make me feel happy. 
 
 
Notes 
 
[1] This charming clay figure, about 9-inches in height, is one I inherited from my mother and whom she named Taffy (presumably because the hat reminded her of traditional Welsh dress). Originally, it contained a small candle which, when lit, illuminated the eyes and mouth in the darkness. It made her happy and it makes me happy. 
      Of course, some will suggest that it's because the object belonged to my mother and reminds me of her that this is why it makes happy. However, whilst this certainly adds to its affective value, I don't think that's the whole story.
 
[2] Graham Harman, Guerrilla Metaphysics: Phenomenology and the Carpentry of Things (Open Court, 2005), p. 244.  
 
[3] Ibid., p. 246.
 
[4] All too often, cultural theorists and philosophers like to investigate negative feelings such as shame, disgust, fear, hate, etc. But it's surely just as valid - and just as vital - to investigate more positive feelings, such as happiness. I agree with Nietzsche's counter-Christian teaching that ethical behaviour is the result of happiness (not vice versa) which is why it makes sense to surround oneself with the objects (be they beautiful or otherwise) that make happy.
 
[5] Sara Ahmed, 'Happy Objects', The Affect Theory Reader, ed. Melissa Gregg and Gregory J. Seigworth (Duke University Press, 2010), pp. 29-51. The line quoted is on p. 29. 
 
[6] As Ahmed reminds us, "the etymology of 'happiness' relates precisely to the question of contingency: it is from the Middle English 'hap', suggesting chance". See 'Happy Objects', The Affect Theory Reader, p. 30. 
 
[7] Sara Ahmed, 'Happy Objects', The Affect Theory Reader, p. 31. 
 
[8] See John Locke, 'Of Modes of Pleasure and Pain', Chapter XX in Book II of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (dated 1690 but first pubished in 1689).
 

4 Feb 2024

Reflections on the Sorcerer's Apprentice and the Villainy of Things

 
Mickey Mouse as the Sorcerer's Apprentice
Fantasia (Walt Disney, 1940)
 
 
I. 
 
Goethe's Der Zauberlehrling (1797) is a ballad composed of fourteen stanzas with an unusual rhyme scheme. It tells the tale of an occult master and his young disciple who discovers that objects are not always there simply to serve us and may in fact be invested with a malevolent spirit; that an enchanted realm is not necessarily a safe space to inhabit.   

Whilst the poem remains popular in the German-speaking world, I suspect most people know the story of 'The Sorcerer's Apprentice' thanks to its adaptation by Walt Disney in the animated film Fantasia (1940), starring Mickey Mouse - a character about whom the philosopher Byung-Chul Han writes in his fascinating short work Undinge: Umbrüche der Lebenswelt (2021) [a] ...        
 
 
II. 
 
According to Han, the representation of material reality in the Disney universe and Mickey's relationship with things radically changes over time. 
 
In his earliest adventures, inanimate objects of all kinds have their independence and behave in an unpredictable - somewhat treacherous - even dangerous manner. Mickey is constantly obliged to grapple with these objects and they remain a permanent source of frustration for an anthropomorphic mouse attempting to impose his will upon the world, as well as providing comedy gold. 
 
For as Han rightly notes: "The cartoons are entertaining to a large extent because of the villainy of things." [46]

Sadly, however, times have changed and one of the depressing aspects of life today is that things have lost their mischievous character. In transforming material reality into a safe space that offers no resistance or dangers, we have succeeded in subordinating objects to our control. 
 
In other words, objects are obliged to behave themselves and even though we manipulate and exploit them, they no longer have the right to rebel or extract their revenge: 
 
"The villainy of things is now probably a thing of the past. We are no longer maltreated by things. They are not destructive; they do not offer any resistance. [...] Things are submissive. They are submitted to our needs." [46-47]
 
Han continues:
 
"Today, even Mickey Mouse leads a digital, smart and immaterial life. His world is digitalized and informationalized [...] the representation of material reality is markedly different [...] Things no longer have an independent life; they are obedient tools for solving problems." [47]
 
Is this a good thing? Is it right for a cartoon mouse to teach children that there is a quick solution - an app - for everything? 
 
I don't think so. 
 
And, personally, I would prefer life to be problematic; that physical reality remain something we constantly bump up against. I rather like being at the mercy of objects which not only want to harm or make fools of us, but also support, sustain, and comfort us.  
 
Ultimately, I agree with the young witch who recently informed me: 'When non-things beckon us to enter a virtual abyss, it will be the saving power of actual objects that will summon us back into the nearness of the nearest.' [b]
 
 
Notes
 
[a] This work was translated into English as Non-things: Upheaval in the Lifeworld, by Daniel Steur, (Polity Press, 2022). Page numbers given in the above post refer to this edition.
     
[b] I'm paraphrasing here from a paper due to be presented at Treadwell's Bookshop, on 8 February 2024, entitled Bells, Books, and Candles: On the Continuing Allure of Actual Objects in an Age of Virtual Reality. For more information - and an abstract - see the most recent entry on the TTA Events page: click here.